In Subversion, Lennart Maschmeyer provides a powerful new theory and analysis of an age-old concept. While a strategy of subversion offers great strategic promise in theory, it faces an underappreciated set of challenges that limit its strategic value in practice. Drawing from two major cases--the KGB's use of traditional subversion methods to crush the Prague Spring in 1968 and Russia's less successful use of cyberwarfare against Ukraine since 2014--Maschmeyer demonstrates both the benefits and weaknesses of the approach. While many believe that today's cyber-based subversion campaigns offer new strategic opportunities, they also come with their own challenges. Because of these disadvantages, cyber operations continue to fall short of expectations--most recently in the Russo-Ukrainian war. By showing that traditional subversion methods remain the more potent threat, Subversion forces us to reconsider our fears of the subversive potential of cyberwar.

"This even-handed and thoroughly researched study of subversion adds significantly to our understanding of covert cyber operations carried out by nations against adversaries. With insightful case studies of Russian invasions into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2013 and again in 2022, the book proved a highly readable and reliable examination of cyber conflict in the modern era."" - Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor Emeritus, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia

"In Subversion: From Covert Operations to Cyber Conflict, Lennart Maschmeyer develops a deductive theory of subversion that he skillfully applies with rich case studies to a carefully scoped set of cases and strategic outcomes. When applied to cyber operations, he helps advance understanding of cyber's utility, particularly the limits of cyber effects operations as tools of regime change or as substitutes for physical attack."" - Emily O. Goldman, US Cyber Command

"This is a genuinely important book. That's because a generation of policymakers and opinion formers have been conditioned to think of cyber capabilities both those pointed against them and their own - as immediately available, low-risk, easy-to-use tools that can deliver decisive and - if you want - deniable impact against a range of targets...Maschmeyer has done a public service with his meticulously researched and extensively evidenced debunking of such nonsense." - Ciaran Martin, Lawfare