Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content. According to this theory, the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. Propositions are types of these actions, which we use to classify and individuate our attitudes and speech acts. Hanks abandons several key features of the traditional Fregean conception of propositional content, including the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-conditions, the distinction between content and force, and the concept of entertainment. The main difficulty for this traditional conception is the problem of the unity of the proposition, the problem of explaining how propositions have truth conditions and other representational properties. The new theory developed here, in its place,explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.

"Propositional Content is a highly enjoyable and interesting contribution to the literature on the nature and role of propositions in philosophy. Moreover, by providing a detailed, book-length defense of the type-view of propositions, PC reinforces this way of thinking about propositions as a main contender in this area. . . . [it] is to be praised for raising a range of central questions, and for thoughtfully and clearly showing how the view of propositions as types of acts handles a host of issues. It should be a must-read for anyone interested in the nature of propositions." - Andreas Stokke, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews