In this book, the Bush administration's war in Iraq is assessed using an interdisciplinary approach and historical analysis that will help readers better understand the results of the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine from 2003 to the present.

In this book, the Bush administration's war in Iraq is assessed using an interdisciplinary approach and historical analysis that will help readers better understand the results of the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine from 2003 to the present. Contesting History: The Bush Counterinsurgency Legacy in Iraq uses a comparative analysis of history to assess the Bush administration's actions in Iraq, focusing specifically on the policy of counterinsurgency. Insurgency exists within an extended timeframe and exhibits a global reach, argues comparative warfare expert Matthew J. Flynn. Therefore, understanding this phenomenon is best realized through an examination of guerrilla conflicts around the world over time; this book provides that approach. The work analyzes U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine during the Iraq War from 2003 to the present, and offers relevant historical comparisons to conflicts dating back to the mid-19th century, in which a nation enjoyed marked military superiority over their enemy. In doing so, it encourages readers to link the Afghanistan and Iraq wars in the broad context of the utilization of counterinsurgency operations to achieve policy objectives. Ultimately, the book illustrates how the tactical "military" success of the U.S. surge in Iraq still nets a strategic failure.

"Comparing several specific past conflicts and relating them to the Iraq War of 2003, Flynn, a specialist in US/world comparative warfare, finds that the attack on Iraq was not necessary to protect the US as the Bush administration proclaimed, and indeed damaged the country's national security. He looks at French intervention in Mexico 1861-67 as liberation, the Ottoman Empire holding onto chaos in the Arabian Peninsula 1916-18, impossible resistance to the American war in Vietnam 1965-75, the Soviet Union bringing a better ideology to Afghanistan 1979-89, warfare as ritual in Chechnya 1994-99, and creating an insurgency to fight the battle that came after victory in Iraq 2003 to the present. He concludes that conventional military force by itself seldom if ever defeats an insurgency." - Reference & Research Book News