In Against Obligation, Abner Greene upends conventional wisdom about several fundamental political questions. Why and when must people obey the law? What does religious freedom require in a liberal democratic state? Must judges and citizens respect historical views about constitutional meaning? Smart, ambitious, provocative, and original--this tightly argued and broad-ranging book compels readers to reexamine basic assumptions about political obligation, constitutional democracy, and religious freedom. -- Christopher Eisgruber, Princeton University Against Obligation is one of the finest contributions to constitutional theory in recent years. Abner Greene shows the connections between questions of political and interpretive obligation in this remarkably incisive work. His arguments against the leading justifications of political and interpretive obligation are vigorous and fair. And his arguments for the multiple sources of obligation and interpretive authority in a liberal democracy are creative, normatively attractive, and deeply grounded in a powerful account of our constitutional order. -- James E. Fleming, Boston University

Do citizens of a nation such as the United States have a moral duty to obey the law? Do officials, when interpreting the Constitution, have an obligation to follow what that text meant when ratified? To follow precedent? To follow what the Supreme Court today says the Constitution means?

These are questions of political obligation (for citizens) and interpretive obligation (for anyone interpreting the Constitution, often officials). Abner Greene argues that such obligations do not exist. Although citizens should obey some laws entirely, and other laws in some instances, no one has put forth a successful argument that citizens should obey all laws all the time. Greene’s case is not only “against” obligation. It is also “for” an approach he calls “permeable sovereignty”: all of our norms are on equal footing with the state’s laws. Accordingly, the state should accommodate religious, philosophical, family, or tribal norms whenever possible.

Greene shows that questions of interpretive obligation share many qualities with those of political obligation. In rejecting the view that constitutional interpreters must follow either prior or higher sources of constitutional meaning, Greene confronts and turns aside arguments similar to those offered for a moral duty of citizens to obey the law.