Can you be morally obligated to do something? To renowned philosopher Ishtiyaque Haji, the answer is guardedly no. Regardless of whether determinism is true, he argues, there is a prima facie plausibility that there are no moral obligations. Powerfully and efficiently, Haji develops a conclusion that has major implications for how we conceive issues in moral responsibility and free will. The book develops the obligation dilemma as clearly as possible. The next step will be for further sustained philosophical work to solve it, assuming it can be resolved, inspired by Haji. In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the well-known responsibility dilemma, where no one is morally responsible for anything. When suitably amended, the strongest recommendations in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma neither fully support nor undermine the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma's implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency.

"In his exciting and challenging new book, The Obligation Dilemma, Ishtiyaque Haji presents forceful arguments which, if correct, show that moral obligation is incompatible both with determinism and with indeterminism. Determinism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of freedom of action that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Indeterminism plausibly would entail that we lack the kind of control over our actions that, arguably, we must have, if we have any obligations. Since our world is either deterministic or indeterministic, Haji's arguments thus seem to show that there are no moral obligations. Must we conclude that everything is permitted? This is a significant challenge to moral philosophy, and to our conception of morality as setting constraints on how we are permitted to act." - David Copp, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of California, Davis

"Haji makes an impressive, powerful case for the existence of a deep problem about the very possibility of moral obligation, one that resembles problems about the possibility of free will and moral responsibility but is even more challenging. This carefully argued, insightful book accords sustained critical attention to a wealth of relevant literature on obligation, free will, and moral responsibility, and it will undoubtedly motivate readers to try to develop a solution to Haji's obligation dilemma. It is an important, ground-breaking contribution to the literature." - Alfred Mele, William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University