The Case for Gridlock explains how, in an effort to make the system more egalitarian and forward thinking, American Progressivism led to the creation of government institutions that increased the political advantages of superior organization, thereby enabling "special interests" to dominate the policy process. The book makes the case for the Constitutional Principle, showing how gridlock-prone institutions lead to better representation of broader interests.

"In the interest of limiting the power of government, James Madison and the framers of the US Constitution created a system of political institutions notoriously resistant to policy change; it tends toward gridlock. Reformers chafe at the many 'veto points' available to organized interests to stifle policy change. This important, well-researched, provocative book demonstrates how progressive reformers sought to shift the power to shape policy from the legislative branch to the executive bureaucracy. Ethridge (Univ. of Wisconsin) argues that reformers viewed this as a strategy for limiting the power of 'special interests' to stymie policy change; beyond the reach of interest groups, technocrats in the bureaucracy would promote policy changes consistent with the reformers goals. What the reformers failed to appreciate was, first, the ability of interest groups to infiltrate the bureaucracy and promote their interests, often in ways diametrically opposed to the reformers' intentions, and, second, the capacity of Congress to overcome the influence of groups and generate policy change. He argues that a return to the 'constitutional principle' of gridlock, in which special interests must compete in a legislative forum, presents the best means of promoting the public interest. Recommended." - CHOICE, November 2010

"Ethridge offers a good analysis of an overlooked topic…and its importance for public policy…. Persuasively challenge what most people believe about politics….deserves readers concerned about the origins and consequences of regulation in the United States." - Regulation, Fall 2010