Since its establishment after World War II, the State of Israel has sought alliances with non-Arab and non-Muslim countries and minorities in the Middle East, as well as Arab states geographically distant from the Arab-Israel conflict. The text presents and explains this regional orientation and its continuing implications for war and peace. It examines Israel's strategy of outflanking, both geographically and politically, the hostile Sunni Arab Middle East core that surrounded it in the early decades of its sovereign history, a strategy that became a pillar of the Israeli foreign and defense policy. This “periphery doctrine” was a grand strategy, meant to attain the major political-security goal of countering Arab hostility through relations with alternative regional powers and potential allies. It was quietly abandoned when the Sadat initiative and the emerging coexistence between Israel and Jordan reflected a readiness on the part of the Sunni Arab core to deal with Israel politically rather than militarily. For a brief interval following the 1991 Madrid conference and the 1993 Oslo accords, Israel seemed to be accepted by all its neighbors, prompting then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to muse that it could even consider joining the Arab League. Yet this periphery strategy had been internalized to some extent in Israel’s strategic thinking and it began to reappear after 2010, following a new era of Arab revolution. The rise of political Islam in Egypt, Turkey, Gaza, southern Lebanon and possibly Syria, coupled with the Islamic regime in Iran, has generated concern in Israel that it is again being surrounded by a ring of hostile states—in this case, Islamists rather than Arab nationalists. The book analyzes Israel’s strategic thinking about the Middle East region, evaluating its success or failure in maintaining both Israel's security and the viability of Israeli-American strategic cooperation. It looks at the importance of the periphery strategy for Israeli, moderate Arab, and American, and European efforts to advance the Arab-Israel peace process, and its potential role as the Arab Spring brings about greater Islamization of the Arab Middle East. Already, Israeli strategic planners are talking of "spheres of containment" and "crescents" wherein countries like Cyprus, Greece, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia constitute a kind of new periphery. By looking at Israel’s search for Middle East allies then and now, the book explores a key component of Israel’s strategic behavior. Written in an accessible manner for all students, it provides a better understanding of Israel’s role in the Middle East region and its Middle East identity.

"For those weary of the rhetoric of politicians or the propagandizing of think tanks, Alpher’s sparkling book, based on information and experience acquired over 30 years, including interviews with several heads of Mossad, is a torrent of fresh air. As a former intelligence operative, he well knows that all rulers – Israeli or Iranians – combine pragmatism with core beliefs and ideology." - The Guardian

"Dramatic changes have taken place in Israel’s security environment. What were the dynamics of the periphery doctrine in the years between 1956 and 1983? How should the doctrine be evaluated? Can a revised periphery doctrine deal with the new ring of hostility surrounding Israel in a more effective way? Readers will find answers with evolving interpretations in Periphery by Yossi Alpher, one of the most sophisticated professionals on Israeli strategy. . . .In addition to being a thought-provoking book on strategic history, Periphery lays the foundation for future research on a largely overlooked theme, and makes complex historical issues related to Israel’s strategies accessible to both conscientious readers and scholars." - Middle East Policy

"Yossi . . . wrote a very interesting book." - The Iran-Israel Observer

"Yossi Alpher’s book Periphery is an extraordinary attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli strategy aimed at forging alliances with non-Arab states and minorities in the greater Middle East, as well as with remote Arab states, in order to break the isolation inflicted on Israel due to the Arab–Israeli conflict. . . .The fact that Alpher questions whether one can talk of a new periphery doctrine enhances his book’s relevance. . . .The policy recommendations in the book, even those that are more closely related to the 'original periphery,' are still very much relevant." - Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs

"This book is enlightening and well researched, and will serve to educate both lay readers and specialist alike in a subject that moved from the de rigueur to the largely moribund. Moreover, the author’s extraordinary insights into Israeli statecraft as a result of his intelligence background make for a work that I have no hesitation in recommending to all those whose interest in Israel goes beyond the prosaic." - International Affairs