In this important new book, David O'Connor discusses both logical and empirical forms of the problem of inscrutable evil, perennially the most difficult philosophical problem confronting theism. Arguing that both a version of theism ('friendly theism') and a version of atheism ('friendly atheism') are justified on the evidence in the debate over God and evil, O'Connor concludes that a warranted outcome is a philosophical d_tente between those two positions. On the way to that conclusion he develops two arguments from evil, a reformed version of the logical argument and an indirect version of the empirical argument, and deploys both against a central formulation of theism that he describes as orthodox theism. God and Inscrutable Evil makes a valuable contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion.

"[A] careful . . . analysis of the challenge that the existence of evil presents to 'orthodox theism' . . . a remarkable amount of material in compressed format, something that will well serve readers." - Theological Studies

"This book will appeal to anyone who has ever asked why there seems to be so much unnecessary evil and suffering in the world." - Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith

"The book is full of creative thought experiments, detailed and incisive argument, and exposition and analysis that reveal an impressive command of much contemporary literature on this topic." - CHOICE, Fe. 99 Vol. 36 No.6

". . . excellent work . . . chock-full of original, creative analyses and arguments." - The Journal Of Religion

"A number of O'Connor's arguments are persuasive. O'Coonor's central argument against Schlesinger's 'No-Best-Possible-World-Defence' seems well-taken." - Religious Studies, Vol. 35, 1999

"This book is an substantial contribution to contemporary discussion of the evidential force of the fact of evil and the rationality of beleiving in God." - Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy

"O'Connor should be praised for forcefully bringing to our attention the centrality of the standard assumption in the debate over God and evil." - The Philosophical Review